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Introduction 
Agricultural markets continue to evolve creating issues of interest for market participants, 
analysts, and policy makers. Issues of interest in changing agricultural markets in the West 
include the following: 1) price discovery and transactions – shifting from open markets and 
auctions to tighter vertical linkages and private negotiation (Barkema, Drabenstott, and Welch 
1991); 2) collusive behavior and market power of firms purchasing agricultural outputs 
(Barkema, Drabenstott, and Novack 2001); and 3) market impacts of new agricultural policies 
(Orden 2007). The effects of these changes on market outcomes/performance are difficult to 
determine using traditional methods of analysis such as econometrics, as data may not be 
available or because it is challenging to isolate the confounding influences of relevant variables. 
A baseline performance measure, such as the competitive equilibrium, is not observable in 
naturally occurring markets. One approach that addresses these issues is laboratory markets.
2 
The focus of this paper is to explain how induced laboratory market experiments are conducted 
and how results from the laboratory can provide insights and policy prescriptions related to the 
above market issues.  Results from selected studies are reported to demonstrate the application 
and contribution of experiments to policy development. 
Laboratory Market Procedures  
Isolating the impacts of marketplace changes in the laboratory involves creating a market.   Four 
buyers and four sellers are sufficient to create a competitive environment. Buyers and sellers, 
respectively, are given a set of redemption values and unit costs for units traded in the market. 
Buyers make money by purchasing units at a price less than their assigned unit redemption 
value. Sellers earn a profit by selling units at a price greater than unit costs. Control, which is 
essential in experimental studies, is achieved by three conditions (Friedman and Sunder 1994, 
p.13) – monotonicity, more reward is preferred to less; salience, the reward depends on actions 
as defined by the institutional rules; and dominance, utility from the experiment comes from the 
reward medium and other influences are negligible. The experiment is set up to reward 
participants based on their decisions.
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Consider a market demand where each buyer may purchase eight units. The redemption value 
for the first unit is 130 tokens. This value decreases incrementally by 10 tokens to 60 tokens for 
the eighth unit. Similarly, on the supply curve, unit costs begin at 30 tokens and increase by 10 
tokens for each unit to 100 tokens for the eighth unit. Summing horizontally over four buyers 
and four sellers result in induced market demand and supply relations (figure 1). The predicted 
competitive equilibrium price is 80 tokens and the equilibrium quantity is 20 – 24 units. The 
earnings level at equilibrium prices and trades is 150 tokens for each buyer and seller. This 
translates to 1200 tokens total surplus for the market. These competitive predictions can serve 
as base comparators for market outcomes, which include prices; number of trades; and buyer, 
seller and total earnings. 
Figure 1. Induced market demand and supply 
Recruited participants come to a computer laboratory where they are presented instructions for 
the specific experiment. Trial runs, using different unit values and costs than in the main 
experiment, are conducted until all participants are comfortable with the procedures. Multiple 
trading periods (15 – 20) are conducted for each treatment to allow for learning and 
convergence of market outcomes. Subjects are paid in cash at the end of the session. 
Treatments are repeated, with the number of replications depending on the variability of results 
across replications. Market outcomes are analyzed over the replications to separate out 
individual agent influences. 
Results from the experiment sessions often are graphed. An additional description of the data 
and statistical analysis can be conducted by means of a convergence model (Noussair, Plott, 
and Reizman 1995), which is estimated by the Parks (1967) method, given the time-series and 
cross-sections in the data. The convergence model explains the path of market outcomes over 

















trading periods. It can be used to test statistical significance of asymptotes/convergence levels 
of the variables of interest between treatments. Davis and Holt (1993) provide additional details 
on conducting market experiments. 
Laboratory Market Experiments as a Source of Data 
The strength of laboratory methods is control, allowing the investigator to isolate the effects of a 
particular variable of interest. This may be viewed by some as a weakness because reality is 
compromised. An appropriate experimental design will vary only by a few, or perhaps only by 
one, variable. Usually phenomena proceed such that variables are changing simultaneously.  
Inquiries into complex choice occasions may require that numerous experiments be conducted 
before final results are obtained. 
Agricultural economists trained in applied analysis techniques may question experiments as a 
source of valid data. There is no basis necessarily to accept implications from a mathematical 
specification of human behavior as more accurate than those derived from direct observation of 
human behavior from the laboratory. Theoretical analyses can be augmented with observation 
of human behavior from the laboratory, particularly if data from naturally occurring markets are 
unavailable.  Examples include market outcomes from privately negotiated transactions, 
outcomes from potential policies that have not been implemented, and the inability to ascertain 
competitive equilibria for comparison with actual market data.  
Selected Studies Using Laboratory Markets/Experimental Auctions 
The following offers a summary of the results and implications from laboratory market studies 
that address selected issues in agricultural markets in the West. These studies are discussed as 
per the behavioral/policy relevance of results rather than procedures. 
Price Discovery and the Environment in which Transactions Occur 
Price discovery occurs in alternative trading institutions and methods of delivery, which may 
result in different market outcomes and performance. Common trading institutions include 
private negotiation, English auction, posted bid auction, and posted offer auction. In the West, 
the English auction is used primarily in the sale of cattle. However, there is increasing reliance 
on private negotiation trading. Private negotiation of prices also is prevalent between processors 
and retailers. Posted bid pricing is used at grain elevators and posted offer is typical for food 
retailing procurement. The double auction characterizes the trading institution used in the 
exchange of futures contracts (i.e., buyers and sellers are simultaneously posting calls (bids) 
and puts (asks)). 
Two methods of delivery are possible. The first, forward or PTD delivery means the transaction 
price and quantity are agreed upon before the product is produced. The alternative, spot 
delivery, requires inventory in stock before negotiation/trading begins. This has costs/risks that 
are not present in PTD delivery. The spot seller incurs sunk production cost before trading 
begins. Inventories must equal or exceed sales in order to make a trade if carry-over to the next 
production period is not possible (e.g., the case of perishable food products).  
Producer concerns have arisen about price discovery in cattle markets as individually 
negotiated pricing has become the most common method used to establish prices for fed cattle 
purchases (Taylor et al. 2007). Menkhaus, Phillips, and Bastian (2003)  report results related to 





response to this concern (table 1). Sellers do well in an auction-spot setting, in both double and 
English auctions, but particularly in a competitive English auction. Sellers are passive in the 
English auction, while buyers actively bid against each other as in the traditional sale barn 
setting. Mestelman, Welland, and Welland (1987) and Bastian et al. (2008) find market prices 
and trades in spot posted-offer and posted-bid auctions, respectively, to be near the predicted 
competitive equilibrium levels. These results suggest agricultural producers as commodity 
sellers may be better off in competitive auctions as compared to private negotiation. 
The distribution of earnings changes dramatically in private negotiation trading with spot 
delivery. As reported in table 1, the advantage goes to the buyer, leaving the seller with the 
lowest earnings among all of the trading scenarios studied. Two risks affect earnings in the 
private negotiation spot market environment – matching risk, which is faced by both buyers and 
sellers, and advance production risk faced by sellers. Advance production risk results in fewer 
trades and a bargaining disadvantage for sellers, relative to buyers. Unlike private negotiation, 
auctions provide many matches. Limited matches (matching risk), and the associated 
bargaining advantage by buyers when there is advance production, may facilitate monopsony 
power (Menkhaus et al. 2007).  Sellers have a bargaining disadvantage in the environment just 
described highlighting the impacts of advance production risk. If the risk between sellers and 
buyers is reversed or equal, the results are expected to be affected accordingly.  
Table 1. Estimated Convergence Levels of Market Outcomes for Alternative Trading Institutions 
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Source: Calculated from results presented in Menkhaus, Phillips, and Bastian 2003. 
Notes: Experiment sessions for each treatment were conducted for 15 periods. Private 
negotiation was for limited matches (three). 
* Significantly different from the base, competitive equilibrium, 99 percent confidence level from 
the convergence model.  
 
These results suggest the trend away from auctions toward more private negotiation, in some 
sectors of the food industry, may result in lower returns for sellers of agricultural 
commodities/products. This is particularly relevant when price negotiation follows production 
and sellers incur greater risk compared to buyers, as is the case in many agricultural markets. 
Total market surplus, also deviates from the competitive model most in private negotiation 





trading institution and method of delivery can influence market outcomes. 
These results offer evidence useful to researchers and policy makers regarding agricultural 
markets becoming more concentrated and dominated by private negotiation. Ward et al. (1996) 
indicate that in private negotiation trading bargaining ability of agents impacts market outcomes.  
As private negotiation becomes more dominant and concentration of buyers increases, the risk 
of sellers being matched with buyers that have improved bargaining power is increased.  Two 
industry practices in the fed cattle market that may exacerbate this phenomenon include grid 
marketing and short trading windows.  Increased use of grid marketing and increased 
incidences of captive supplies being held by buyers, which potentially creates short trading 
windows in cattle markets, both may reduce the ability of sellers to be matched with buyers 
willing to pay higher prices for cattle in a private negotiation setting (Menkhaus et al. 2007).      
Collusive Behavior in English Auctions 
While the auction environment is generally advantageous for sellers, repeated English auctions 
are susceptible to cooperative behavior among buyers, which can be detrimental to seller 
earnings (Milgrom 1989). Buyers are able to acquire knowledge of rivals’ bidding strategies and 
reservation prices by observing their bidding behavior, especially in repeated auctions of 
multiple items such as in livestock auctions.  An example of this is the use of shared agents in 
livestock auctions.  This has the potential to increase concentration of bidders within an auction 
setting. Several studies provide evidence of price depression resulting from increased 
concentration of bidders in a single English auction market (Bailey, Brorsen, and Fawson 1993; 
Adam et al. 1991). 
Laboratory markets were used to study collusion in a series of sequential English auctions in 
which participants (either two or six buyers) were only bidders and quantities for sale were 
exogenously determined (Phillips, Menkhaus, and Coatney 2003; Menkhaus, Phillips, and 
Coatney 2003). Several facilitating influences were examined – the same set of bidders over a 
series of seven auctions (base treatment); knowledge of the number of units for sale; 
communication via an online chat; and the provision of multiple buy orders by competing 
principals to the same agent buyer.  Another set of treatments involved analyzing how trade 
prices were impacted as the market evolved to a more concentrated state via a buyer selection 
process designed to retain the most successful agents throughout all auction rounds.  These 
treatments mimic behavior at many livestock auctions.  Auction participants observe cattle 
quality and quantity prior to the auction and may in some cases converse with other buyers 
regarding their intentions.  The industry practice of using shared agents with multiple buy orders 
from several packer principals results in increased market concentration at livestock auctions.  
Results indicate that market practices in multiple-unit, repeated English auctions may facilitate 
collusive behavior when there are two buyers, as well as when there are six buyers. Moreover, 
the knowledge of the number of units for sale in an upcoming auction was found to be at least 
as effective in helping two agents cooperate as open communication. Without facilitating 
influences, two buyers were about as competitive in their bidding behavior as six buyers in this 
auction setting.   A comparison of two-buyer auctions with six-buyer auctions reveals how 
cooperative six buyers can become. Knowledge of quantity for sale did not coordinate six 
buyers as well as two. Communication, however, helped six buyers coordinate at least as much 
as in the two-buyer case. A simple bid-sharing plan that let bidders alternate taking the low bid 
was focal and allowed for successful collusion among six buyers. Simple turn taking became 
focal for two buyers when quantity for sale was announced, which contributes to stability for the 





opportunities for collusive behavior. The evolution of concentration that left the most successful 
buyers in a sequence of laboratory auction sessions depressed price to levels about 26% below 
the competitive prediction – about the same amount as when two buyers participated in the 
sequence of auctions with quantity for sale known. 
Quantities in naturally occurring livestock auctions are often known.  Historical trends indicate 
increased concentration among agent-buyers.  This changing auction environment suggests an 
increased risk of collusive behavior in livestock auctions. 
Ex Ante Evaluation of Alternative Agricultural Policies – The Case of Decoupled 
Subsidies 
As agricultural markets adapt to globalization, increasing scrutiny of traditional agricultural 
policies that provide income transfers to producers has occurred. This indicates the need to 
investigate the policy alternatives apriori (OECD 2006). The use of subsidy payments decoupled 
from output has been proposed to meet the World Trade Organization goal of not distorting 
production and trade (Orden 2007; Orden and Diaz-Bonilla, 2006). The question becomes how 
to investigate potential market impacts of a decoupled policy when little or no data exist for use 
in economic analyses. Research reported by Bastian et al. (2008) investigated the issue using 
laboratory market experiments.  
A posted-bid auction, used for price discovery in grain markets, was chosen as the trading 
institution for the laboratory sessions. Four alternative treatments were investigated: 1) no 
policy; 2) coupled support price and deficiency payment; 3) coupled support price and switch to 
lump sum subsidy (decoupled); and, 4) coupled support price and switch to period or annual 
subsidy (decoupled). Sellers were made aware of policy treatments via instructions prior to 
conducting each experiment.  Sellers were informed of the policy change before the period in 
which the switch occurred (treatments three and four).  
Results indicate the stylized coupled support price and deficiency payment treatment produced 
market outcomes consistent with those from known target-price policy effects. Relative earnings 
suggested the subsidy was largely passed on to buyers through lower prices under the coupled 
deficiency payment policy treatment. Despite identical total payment amounts, buyers did not do 
as well under decoupled policies (lump sum or annual subsidy) as in deficiency payment 
treatments. Buyer earnings were still higher than in the no policy treatment since prices were 
lower. Production levels in the decoupled treatments (three and four) were similar in production 
levels as compared to that in the no policy treatment. Thus, the experiments confirmed 
theoretical predictions by Tangermann (1991) that decoupled policies do not distort production. 
Experiment results also indicated a potential moral hazard issue related to price negotiation 
when subsidies (both coupled and decoupled) are given to sellers.  Producers were less 
aggressive in negotiating price when receiving a subsidy, thereby transferring a portion of 
income to buyers. Policy makers continue to investigate alternative policies that are decoupled.  
These results suggest some policy alternatives may be more efficient at transferring income 
while reducing market distortions. 
Conclusion 
These results show experiments can provide insights for Western agricultural market trends.  
Spot sellers likely will become increasingly disadvantaged as agricultural markets become 
dominated by private negotiation.   The impacts of regulations and programs designed to 





The experiments provide powerful predictions of the role certain factors may play in facilitating 
potential collusive behavior in cattle markets.  The use of shared agents representing multiple 
principals requires further scrutiny. 
It appears that policy analysts are increasingly interested in results from laboratory studies.  
They view experimental economics as a potential tool for ex-ante policy analyses.  This is not 
surprising as policy analysts often do not have access to relevant data to address questions 
raised by decision makers and legislators. As structural change in the food supply chain and 
budget constraints for gathering agricultural statistics continue, the interest in the use of 
experimental methods seems likely to increase. 
As markets in the West become less transparent, agricultural economists will continue to be 
called upon to provide policy relevant analyses. New research methods will be needed to 
conduct investigations with limited data. Experimental economics techniques will become an 
increasingly relevant methodology.  It should be noted that wherever possible, additional 
analyses that complement experimental results will be of increasing interest. 
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